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Abstract 
This puper proposes thut the representation of the referent of discozirse might be 
characterized as the constr~ictio?z and updating of a non-linguistic mental model. Mental models 
of the referent allow the reader to set L L ~  some i~nplicitparameters such as temporal, spatial, and 
behavioral scales, magnitude of quantifiers, etc. The set up of these parameters is critica1 to 
appropriately understand and integrate new pieces of injormationfrom the incomiizg text. 
A secondfunction o f  rnodelling is to compute the consequences of the events described 
by the text. There is psychological evidence demonstrating that comprehenders are ver); efficient 
in calc~alating on-Iine the consequences of described events or changes. However, it is d i f ic~l l t  
for a p~irely deductive processor (e.g., a declarative data base plus some rules) to compute 
appropriately the effects of chunge. This is the so culled cframe problem». Such problem might 
be overcome by means o f a  mental model account. Mental nzodels are sensitii~e to the iinplicit 
knowledge of world's regularities and, as a consequelzce, some courses of ~nodelitzg are more 
likely thuiz others. This i~nplies afunctional advantage: The nulnberofpotential models foragive~z 
linguistic message can be drastically reduced. 
Traditiorzally the mental models frurnework has focusedon the representation of spatial 
contents. However, I suggest that mental rnodels involve also the representation ofpsycho-social 
urzd self traits. Cornprehension, is a knowledge state that potentially involves an ecological, a 
psycho-social, anda selfmodel. A t a  given moment certuin leve1 of modelling is more prominent 
(foregroiind) than the others (background). 
Some computationulprinciples are proposed iiz order to guide aiz eventual irnplemen- 
tution of~nental models. First, the building blocks that underlies models areprinzitives. Prinlitives 
are variable rather than discrete andj7xed semantic values. Secondly, the buildilzg and updating 
of models demand cognitive resources, therefore mental models are sensitive to the structural 
limits of the system (e.g., working nzemory, attentional resources). Thirdly, the updating of mental 
models is cyclic rather than continuous, and it takesplace at the end of the main text constituents 
(clauses, sentences and paragraphs). Fourthly, some models' parameters are structurally 
isonzorphic (some spatial relutionships, the temporal structure of events, etc.). Finally, the 
cornputation ofprimitives in the model is based in a multiple constraints principie. 
According to the modular approach to cognition the only scientifically 
describable events of human mind are those related to the encapsulated «modules» (e.g., 
Fodor, 1983). On its side, the conceptual or «central processor» is, by definition, too 
flexible and indeterminate as to be properly analyzed by conventional scientific 
procedures. Therefore, if we study language comprehension we must focus on relatively 
specialized or modular components such as phonological and graphemic processing, 
lexical access, syntactic parsing and so forth. 
It is likely that the functional architecture of language processing involves 
some modular or encapsulated mechanisms. However, at some stage of processing, 
language might have close interfaces with the conceptual system. Thus, comprehension 
of discourse requires that the listener or reader builds up a non-linguistic representation 
of the referent of discourse and this conceptual activity is almost simultaneous to the 
more linguistic levels of discourse processing. In the same vein, speakers encode their 
linguistic messages starting with a pre-verbal representation elaborated by the conceptual 
system or the «conceptualizer» (Levelt, 1989). The mechanisms responsible for the 
representation of reference are still unclear. However, the notion of «mental models» is a 
promising framework which have generate a remarkable amount of relevant research. 
The critical insight of the mental models framework (also named «situation 
models», «possible worlds», «scenarios», etc.) is that the comprehender builds a 
representation of the referent of the text (the objects, events, objects and processes 
descnbed or implicit in the text) rather than -or in addition to- arepresentation of the text 
itself(Sanford&Garrod, 1982; Johnson-Laird, 1980,1983; vanDijkandKintsch, 1983; 
Garnham, 1987; Glenberg et al., 1987). An illustration of this idea is the expenment of 
Glenberg, Meyer and Linden (1987). Subjects were given small text like this: 
(1) John was preparing for a marathon in August (Setting sentence) 
(2a) After doing a few warm-up exercises, he put on his sweatshirt and 
went jogging (Critical associated) 
(2b) After doing a few warm-up exercises, he took off his sweatshirt and 
went jogging (Critical dissociated) 
(3) He jogged halfway around the lake without too much difficulty 
(Filler) 
(4) Further along his route, however, John's muscles began to ache 
(Filler) 
Target: SWEATSHIRT 
Subjects read a given version of the text with instructions of comprehension, 
and immediately they received the target word. They were asked to decide as soon as 
possible whether or not the target hadbeen included in the text. The critical manipulation 
was that in the second sentence there were two alternative versions. In the critical 
associate version (2a) the meaning of the target word was «attached» to the main 
character by means of the action descnbed by the verb. In the critica1 dissociated version 
(2b) the target was dissociated as a consequence of the character's action. 
As was expected the decision time for targets was shorter in the associated than 
in the dissociated version of the texts. The association between the target object and the 
main character determined that the cntical concept were more accesible. This acces- 
sibility relies on the situation model rather than on the surface features of the text. In fact, 
the words between the critical word («put on» or «take off») and the target were exactly 
the same under both versions of the texts. 
A propositional account of text's representation cannot explain either the 
observed differences, as both the associated and the dissociated versions of the text have 
virtually the same propositional structure. Thus, the propositional structure for the 
critical associated sentence and for the critical dissociated one only differ in a single 
concept. 
(5) ... he put on his sweatshirt ... 
(5') <JOHN, SWEATSHIRT, PUT ON> 
(6) ... he took off his sweatshi rt... 
(6') <JOHN, SWEATSHIRT, TOOK OFF> 
There is no apparent reason for becoming more closely associated the nodes 
<JOHN> and <SWEATSHIRT> in (5') than in (6'). Notice that a propositional system 
involves computations upon uninterpreted symbols. Namely, the content or meaning of 
the symbols might be irrelevant in terms of the resulting strength of connections among 
them. Therefore, both predicates (PUT ON and TOOK OFF) should take the same 
associative power in order to connect the corresponding concepts. The empirical results 
(better accessibility of the target SWEATSHIRT under the associated condition) 
suggest that the computation of text referent relies on fine-grained details of our world 
knowledge. 
Approaching comprehension from amental model framework has demonstrated 
to be useful. Mental models put the emphasis in a different theoretical perspective and, 
consequently, new hypothesis are available. Thus, the emphasis of the mental model 
approach is on: 
- The representation of referents triggered by the text (including thematic 
inferences) rather than on the structural or formal features of the text. 
- Post-lexical processing rather than on lexical processing. 
- On-line or incremental changes in representations rather 
than the final (off-line) products of comprehension. 
- Isomorphic dimensions of text representation rather than 
on linguistic or propositional codes. 
Some function of mental models in comprehension 
The notion of mental model has been used as an explanatory notion for severa1 
psycholinguistic phenomena such as text structure and co-reference, thematic infer- 
ences and expectations, anaphonc reference, narrative perspective, focus and back- 
ground in comprehension, etc. 1 will focus on two less mentioned phenomena that in my 
opinion have to do with our modeling capabilities: the implicit scale set up and the 
modelling of change. 
Scale set up 
When the reader or listener processes a linguistic message she has to set up the 
appropriate scale for severa1 dimensions such as time, spatial coordinates, speed, action 
level, etc. These particular scales determine a dimensional field that allows the reader 
to appropriately interpret and integrate the incoming text. Dimensional scales fre- 
quently are not explicit in the linguistic message but should be figured out in a top-down 
manner from some semantic clues provided by the text. 
For instance, spatial distance referred by the verb: TO APPROACH is different 
in (7) and (8). The size of the corresponding goals determines a different ((approaching 
distante)) in the reader's mental model. 
(7) We were approaching Chicago 
(8) We were approaching the door 
(Morrow and Clark, 1988) 
The temporal scale established from a given temporal adverbial depends on the 
semantic context provided by the sentence (van Jaarsveld & Schreuder, 1986). For 
instance, the present denoted by NOW involves different magnitudes in (9) and (lo), and 
the time interval denoted by JUST differs in (1 1) and (12). 
(9) The sky's color is changing now 
(10) Europe is changing now 
(1 1) John has just smoked a cigarette 
(12) John has just got married 
(van Jaarsveld & Schreuder, 1986) 
A clear demonstration that parameters are set up is that any violation in the 
implicit scales is often perceived as an error, ajoke ora  bizarre expression. For instance 
(13) is a violation of both the temporal and the behavioral scales: 
(13) Q: Well ... now that you have finished your PhD what are you going to do? 
A: 1 am going to have a coffee 
The clues used by the comprehender to establish the scales of a dimensional 
field are vaned (the sizes of objects, places or agents, the level of the character's goals 
and intentions, etc.). Hypothetically, dimension scales correlate among then~, therefore, 
the reader might be able to compute the value of implicit parameters from the explicit cues 
provided by the text. For instance, given a very small moving agent (e.g. an spider) we can 
«infer» a dimensional field involving small scales for time, space, behavioral level, etc. 
Notice that the elusive phenomena of ((connotative meaningx might be 
partially explained as an implicit set up of mental model scales. Actually, connotative 
meaning cannot be properly understood as a lexical phenomenon. The meanings 
denoted by come words in different linguistic or communication contexts are not fixed 
entries «pre-stored» nor «accessed» from a lexicon. For instance, there are not pre- 
stored magnitudes for «few», «now», ((approaching distante)), etc. Instead, these 
magnitudes are computed from a dimensional field or mental model. 
The modeling of change 
Mental models are dynarnic. In other words, the representations of one or 
severa1 of its entities are transformed in the course of time. However, the question of 
change is rather complex, as a given transformation in a single entity can determine an 
effect on severa1 parameters of the model. Let us see a short text that describes a situation 
model or scenario and some events: 
(14) John is sitting in front of his office table 
(15) At his right there is a cup of coffee on its plate 
(16) In front of him there is an article on the table 
(17) At his left there is a bookshelf 
(1 8) John takes the cup and gives a small drink of coffee 
(19) John took a new book from the bookshelf 
Sentences (14) to (17) allow the reader to build a representation of a static 
model of a physical environment. Sentence (18) conveys information about a simple 
action. This action (an object manipulation) produces severa1 changes in the parameters 
of the model. Not only the cup changes its location but, as a consequence of this change, 
the relative positions and states of a few things became different while others remain 
equal. Thus, the action modifies the relative position between: the article and the cup, 
the cup and the plate, etc. However, another spatial relations remain unchanged: the 
plate and the book, the book and John, etc. 
The principle underlying the readjustment of positional parameters that 
follows the action seems straightforward in the above example. The moving object 
approaches a landmark (in this case John's lips) and, consequently, the moving object 
takes the positional parameters of the landmark. However, things are more complicated 
than that: Why does the coffee follows the cup in its displacement? and why the plate 
does not?. Initially the triad «coffee, cup, platen belonged to the same spatial cluster in 
the model, however a given action causes that two entities became detached from the 
third one. Furthermore, a small modification in the action can produce a different pattern 
of consequences. For instance, if the action (1 8) substitutes: «John got the plate and gave 
a small drink of coffee» then the three entities remain together in their movement. In 
summary, the readjustment of positional parameters in a model involves some subtle 
knowledge about the behavior of supporters, containers, gravity, and so forth. 
Even more complex is the pattern of change during and after the action (19) 
because the initial scene had been described from the character's perspective. There- 
fore, if the character moves many situational parameters should be readjusted to keep 
his perspective. Moreover, often the character's actions determine that some entities 
came out of focus while others enter the focus and became more accesible (Anderson, 
Garrod and Sanford, 1984; Glenberg et al., 1987). 
A possible argument is to say that the reader just does not make al1 these 
implicit computations because it is not necessary. That is probably true in many cases 
of superficial reading in which the subject does not bother to elaborate a complete and 
coherent representation of the referent (Oakhill et al., 1989). However, there is some 
evidence that the reader is able to some extent to make parameters adjustment after a 
given change has been descnbed by the text. For instance, Duffy (1986) found that 
subjects generated expectations about the consequences of a physical phenomenon 
described in short texts. This is an example of an item: 
(20) John was eating his first meal ever in the dining car of a train 
(21) The waiter brought him a large bowl of bean soup 
(22) John tasted the hot soup carefully 
(23a) Suddenly the train screeched to a stop (high expectation) 
(23b) The train slowed down entering a station (low expectation) 
(24a) The soup spilled al1 over John's clean shirt and pants (key event) 
(24b) The waiter came to offer John some coffee (script related) 
There were two critica1 experimental manipulations: the expectation value of 
the fourth sentence (high or low) and the content of the target sentence (either describing 
the inferred event or an script based action). The reading time of the target sentences was 
the dependent measure. The results showed that under the high expectation condition 
(23a) reading time was faster for the sentence describing the key event (24a) than the 
script related one (24b). Conversely, under the low expectation conditions (23b) there 
were no differences. This experiment suggest that the subject is able to make some rather 
sophisticated computations on the implicit parameters of the situation model. Further- 
more, the outcome of these computations determines inferences or expectations more 
salient than the script-based default values. 
How a given change (e.g., an action or an event) affects the whole model state?. 
What should be up-dated and what would remain equal?. These are non-trivial 
questions. Many of these changes are not explicit in the text because the text producer 
assumes that the reader will infer them by means of her implicit world knowledge. 
However, there are not simple rules that allow to predict what will change and what will 
remain equal. In order to appropriately address these questions we need a more elaborate 
notion of the underlying mechanisms and constraints of mental models. 
The problem of modelling change is familiar to the Artificial Intelligence 
researchers who havelabeledit the «frameproblem» (Fodor, 1983,1988; Janlert, 1988). 
The problem emerge in robots design. An efficient robot that performs goal-oriented 
actions in a complex environment has to be able to build a dynamic mental model. The 
robot's mental model must keep track of the state of the robot's goals as well as the 
consequences of any environment change produced either by any externa1 agent or by 
the robot itself. The problem of doing that is both quantitative and qualitative. The 
quantitative problem is that an unlimited number of predicates should be checked 
continuously to see whether their truth values are appropriate after the change. This is 
hardly compatible with the time pressure under which a robot (ora human) has to make 
decisions. The qualitative problem is that there are not simple «logical» pnnciples 
governing change and its consequences. Therefore, it is unsuitable to store in the robot's 
memory some simple deductive rules that enable it to adapt its representations to the 
changing world. 
However, the frame problem is probably derived from the technical decision 
of using a declarative format of representation and trying to model change according to 
a deductive logic (Janlert, 1988). In my opinion, the use of some isomorphic parameters 
in the mental model (such as mimicking the temporal structure of events, representing 
structurally spatial relations and quantifiers, and some kinemati transformations) could 
reduce considerably the problem (see section 2.8). 
Mental models are sensitive to world knowledge 
Some authors, notably Pylyshyn (1986), have criticized the notions of cogni- 
tive science that are cognitively penetrable, namely that are influenced by our tacit world 
knowledge, intentions, wishes and so forth. The only scientifically acceptable mechanisms 
are those non-penetrable that operate isolated or encapsulated from the influence of the 
«central system». However, mental models are by definition cognitively penetrable. 
Therefore, there must be features of the models functioning partially derived from our 
implicit knowledge of the world. For instance, the set up of implicit dimensions, the 
representation of change (e.g., mental kinematic), the computation of the consequences 
of change, the changing of focus or perspective. In fact, a mental model is a simulation 
device that operates upon representations of world entities (tokens), and analogically 
represent their transformations, temporal structure, etc. This simulation in order to be 
efficient must be influenced by our knowledge of world regularities. The sensitivity of 
mental models to the knowledge of world regularities probably avoids computational 
overloads, inasmuch as some modelling courses are more perrnissible than others. We 
usually do not waste our time trying to model impossible or implausible world-states, 
such as «five-dimension cats». 
Consider the well known phenomena of mental kinematic. Our mental repre- 
sentation of moving objects (e.g., rotation or scanning) usually mimics our implicit 
knowledge of the ecological environment. In other words, for a living organism mental 
kinematic is anisotropic. First. there is a vertical anisotropy. Although geometrically the 
three dimensions of space are isotropic, from an ecological point of view this is not true. 
Specifically, the vertical dimension is privileged because the bias introduced by gravity 
andlor the head-feet axis of human body (Franklin & Tversky, 1990). Furthermore, the 
vertical axis is asyrnmetric as objects fa11 from top to down, and in order to produce the 
opposite movement some source of power is required. This determines a lot of predictable 
events and relations in our mental model without need to mention them in the surface text. 
Secondly, the environment is horizontally anisotropic. This anisotropy results 
from the design of our body, specifically its motor and perceptual functions. Depth 
dimension is more central because it is associated with the direction of march. In 
addition, the depth's frontal pole is more salient because it is related to the goals and to 
the perceptual field (Clark, Franklin & Tversky, 1990). 
Furthermore, our ecological mental models are probably constrained by the 
implicit knowledge of the reversibility or non-reversibility of particular events (e.g. 
rotation is usually reversible, whereas breaking is non-reversible); and our psycho- 
social models might be constrained by social norms and implicit theories that make 
some modelling courses more permissible than others; finally, our self model is 
constrained both by the social determinants and the self-concept. 
However, there must be something non-penetrable in our mental models. The 
segmentation of reality in come primitive components (Miller & Johnson-Laird, 1976; 
Johnson-Laird, 1983), and the laws goveming kinematic transformations (Shepard, 
1984, Shepard & Cooper, 1982) might be universal, innate functions, or built-in «a 
prioriesx that underlay mental models. 
Mental model's contents 
Mental models involve at least three levels of contents: 
The ecological (or Gibsonian) model. A three-dimensional frame, unfolding 
in time, and containing physical entities spatially and dynamically related, and a 
particular observer's perspective. Actions and events are represented as «mental 
transformations» of objects os objects' parts (e.g., displacement, rotation, physical 
deformation, etc.). These transformations not only affect the target object, but they also 
determine a readjustment of severa1 parameters of the ecological model, such as the 
relative position of the objects, the new distance, the coming in os out of focus, the 
updating of causal links (either their activation or deactivation), the computation o€ 
some predictable consequences of events, and so forth. 
Thepsycho-social model. A frame involving chasacters (actors os agents) with 
individual features, goals and intentions, intespersonal links (emotional links, profes- 
sional roles, social status, etc.), and person-to-objects links (ownership, instrument, 
transference). Notice that the psycho-social model, unlike the ecological model, does 
not correspond to physically «objective» features of the world. To be true, there ase 
physical events and objects in our psycho-social models, but these events and objects 
ase only cues for a higher order interpretation (e.g., in terms of between-personal links, 
status, intentions, etc). For instance, certain facial expressions and gestures are physical 
actions, but they are intespreted as signals that convey an intespersonal meaning, such 
as intentions, feelings, etc. 
The selfmodel. The receiver of a verbal message is herself a psycho-social 
character with a very asticulate representation of the self and its states (e.g., goals, 
intentions, status, emotional and affective links, ownership, and so on). In many 
occasions, specially if the receiver is involved in a conversational setting, she has to 
monitor the self model as a function of the events and actions that ase incorporated in 
the model generated by the conversation. The monitoring of the self model relies on the 
fact that the listener belongs herself to the ongoing psycho-social model. However, even 
if the listener attends some impersonal source of discourse (a fiction narrative os an 
expository text) the self model might be monitored and readjusted to some extent. Thus 
the reader can vicariously shift her mood (feeling intrigued, amazed, surprised, etc., see 
Brewer, 1985) as a function of her unfolding model of text's characters and situations. 
There is another aspect in which the self model is actively engaged in the 
comprehension processes. The self operates as ametacognitive monitoring device. Thus 
the reader or the listener is usually aware of her understanding level, the plausibility, 
permissibility os truth of the world state referred by the text, etc. This metacognitive 
monitoring has functional consequences in terms of processing strategies. The subject 
can regulate her cognitive activity according to the comprehension state monitored by 
the self model. This regulation is based on severa1 possible strategies as asking questions 
(in conversational settings), going back to pasts of the text previously read, trying to 
elaborate more the current model according to her world knowledge, etc. 
Knowledge is a three-way model. The ecological model, the psycho-social 
model, and the self-model converge to produce a knowledge state in a given moment. 
In fact, the three models are not simply additive. They compete in strength and 
prominence and they constraint each other and the resulting knowledge state is a 
compromise among them. This compromise involves a definition of the prominent leve1 
that must be the most accessible to subject's awareness. In most situations (including 
comprehension of narratives) the more activated model might correspond to the psycho- 
social parameters, whereas the ecological and the self model are in the background. 
During the comprehension of discourse our knowledge state gradually changes. 
This change can be interpreted as the unfolding of the three-way model. Al1 the relevant 
parameters -belonging to the ecological model, the psycho-social model and the self 
model- are updated as the incoming text is processed. This can produce breaks or 
transitions in the knowledge state (the three-way model state). Thus, in a given moment, 
the text describes that the character has reached a goal and the corresponding intention 
might be deactivated in the reader's model, perhaps new intentions and goals became 
activated, and the new actions involve a different temporal andlor spatial scale than the 
previous one, and so on. Gersnbacher (1985) calls «processing shifts» to these breaks 
in the representational continuity. According to her hypothesis an ongoing «substruc- 
ture» is kept while the incoming information is coherent with it. When information is 
less coherent (changes in topic, point of view, place, time, etc.) then a new substructure 
starts. These breaks of shifts in our representation of reference have severa1 empirical 
effects that 1 will describe in the next section. 
Computational principies 
Mental models must be computable (Johnson-Laird, 1983, 1988). However, 
up to now the notion of mental models has been difficult to implement and it remains 
as an intuitive notion. However, some empirical and theoretical constraints can be 
established on an eventual computational theory of mental models. 
Building blocks. Our modeling capabilities must require a limited set of 
elementary units or «primitives». These primitives might be universal entities such as 
«time», «space», «cause», «event», «object», «person», «intention», etc. (e.g., Miller & 
Johnson-Laird, 1976; Johnson-Laird, 1983). Prirnitives should be understood as vari- 
able entities rather than as fixed and discrete semantic values. A primitive is actualized 
in different ways according to the value of the other primitives concurrently activated 
in the model. We already have described some examples of this interactive actualization 
of prirnitives: the contextual set up of dimensions such as time, size, quantity, etc. In the 
same vein, cause is not a fixed, and abstract relationship but a specific content- 
dependent link (compare: «the collision of a stone causes the breakdown of a glass», 
«her love causes his happiness»). 
Str~~ctural  limitations. Mental models presumably are resource demanding, as 
they likely consume working memory space. There is some evidence of the cost of 
mental models in terms of cognitive resources. Johnson-Laird and Bara (1984) demon- 
strated that the larger the number of mental models required by deductive problems the 
more time was spent by subjects and the larger was the amount of errors. On the other 
hand, to build a mental model from a text segment takes longer than a more superficial 
processing of the text. Thus, subjects who were presented with predictive tasks, spent 
more reading time on the scenario inducing source (a single case or individual 
information) than in the less salient quantitative source (Rodrigo, de Vega & Castañeda 
1990). The high resource-demand of modeling was also illustrated by a study of de Vega 
& Díaz (1990). Subjects who read short texts, spent more time in reading the first 
sentence, as well as the next filler sentences, when the starting sentence included an 
scenario inducing word rather than a genenc or indeterminate term. 
Intermittent up-dating. As we have mentioned above the foundation and 
updating of amental model is not acontinuous process. Instead, there are breaks or shifts 
generally located at the end of the minor or major constituents of the text (clauses, 
sentences, and paragraphs). This is an important difference with other text processes, 
such as phonological processing, lexical access, and syntactic parsing, that take place 
immediately or on-line (e.g., Marslen-Wilson, 1975). 
There are some empirical findings that support the end-of-constituents locus 
of integration or mental models updating. First, there is a memory lose of the words' 
surface codes immediately after the reader has crossed a clause boundary (Jarvella, 
1979; Gernsbacher, 1985). This suggest that the reader, at the end of clauses, shifts from 
the lexical codes to some high-order representation. Secondly, studies with on-line 
techniques have shown that the reader makes long pauses in the last word of each 
constituent (Just & Carpenter, 1980; Haberlandt & Graesser, 1985; Daneman & Carpenter, 
1983; de Vega et al., 1990). These last-word pauses are functional as they are related to 
several text parameters. Thus, the pauses duration is a function of the number of «new 
ideas» in the constituent (Haberlandt & Graesser, 1985; de Vega et al., 1990); pauses are 
also longer when subjects receive instruction stressing memory rather than comprehension 
(Haberlandtet al., 1986); fmally, pauses increase whenthe sentenceinclude adesambiguating 
«garden-path» word, suggesting that, at the end of constituents, subjects make a semantic 
assessment of the whole constituent (Daneman & Capenter, 1983). 
There are some alternative interpretation of end of constituent pauses. Particu- 
larly, Kintsch and van Dijk maintain that at these positions the reader actualizes the 
macrostructural representation of the text (Kintsch & van Dijk, 1978; van Dijk & 
Kintsch, 1983; Kintsch, 1988). According to Kintsch & van Dijk, the macrostructure is 
not a mental model but a propositional code. They predict and found out that sentences 
reading times increases as a function of the number of underlying propositions (Kintsch 
& Keenan, 1973). However, the number of propositions can be confused with other 
variables such as the number ofnew concepts. Somerecent studies thatrule out the effect 
of other variables did not find any significant effect of the number ofpropositions neither 
on the sentence reading times nor on the end of constituent pauses (Haberlandt & 
Graesser, 1985; de Vega et al., 1990). 
Isomorphism. Severa1 authors assume some perceptual-like properties of 
mental models but usually they do not elaborate much about it. In principle, it can be 
proposed that mental models format is a conventional propositional one (e.g., van Dijk 
& Kintsch, 1983). However, rather than conceiving the encoding of the referent in terms 
of any sort of lingua mentis, I propose that some of the referent properties are encoded 
in an analogical or isomorphic format. 
Of course 1 do not assume a first order isomorphism, nor any sort of «picture 
in the headx metaphor. Rather 1 am thinking on a second-order or functional isomor- 
phism: Some processing components are shared by direct perceptual experience and the 
modeling of alinguistic source (see similar notions in Shepard & Chipman, 1970; Finke, 
1980; de Vega, 1988). These are some proposed isomorphic dimensions and properties 
of mental models: (a) Static spatial properties like position and distance among 
represented entities; (b) Temporal structure. For instance, the serial order of events in 
the model has a one-to-one correspondence with the perceived order of world's events, 
or the relative duration of events can be also mimicked in the model, (c) Kinematic 
patterns such as mental rotation and mental scanning (Shepard & Cooper. 1982; 
Kosslyn, 1980; Denis, 1988); (d) Some episodic associative links between entities 
mimic the world structure of phenomena. For instance the attachment between objects 
and characters in the mentioned experiment of Glenberg et al.. 1987). 
The advantages of an analogical processing of some parameters is that it avoids 
the practical shortcomings of the frame problem, typical of a purely deductive system. 
The updating of change might be unsolvable if we assume that the subject represents in 
a declarative format al1 the ongoing knowledge and he applies some predicate calculus 
to this massive data base. Even if this were computationally possible (a propositional 
data base plus come deductive algorithms can be a virtual Turing machine) it would be 
unsuitable for practical reasons. A psychological theory of change representation has to 
be able to make the appropriate computations at the appropriate times, namely it has to 
make computations on-line in order to fit adaptive and efficiency requirements. 
On its side, a system that is able to represent analogically some entities and 
their transformations on-line can figure out many consequences of change without 
much effort, by simply «inspecting» the outcome of the dynamic transformations. These 
analogical transformations have been demonstrated in the research field of mental 
imagery (Shepard & Cooper, 1982; Kosslyn et al., 1978; de Vega 1988), and it has been 
suggested that they play an important role in understanding text with spatial descriptions 
(Denis, 1988). 
Multiple constmints. Mental models emerge when the conceptual pieces 
conveyed by a sentence or text are integrated. Integration is holistic as every concept 
(either explicit or implicit) modifies its semantic value depending on the whole 
conceptual matrix implicit in the model. The end product is not a simple addition of 
lexical traces or semantic features but an interactive composed trace that is the outcome 
of come kind of «goodness)> function. The notion of «variable constraints» proposed by 
Rumelhart & Ortony (1977) in their schema theory is very similar. They proposes that 
the instantiation of a given schema component is context-dependent, as its particular 
value is modulated by the other components currently activated. 
The interactive nature of integration is supported by severa1 facts that 1 have 
described: the attributes instantiation phenomena (context activates a subset of concep- 
tual attributes), the computation of implicit parameters (spatial and temporal scales, 
leve1 of intentions and actions, etc.), and the computation of some remote consequences 
of changes. 
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